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Abstract—We study the interaction between the power grid
and the communication network used for its control. We design a
centralized emergency control scheme under both full and partial
communication support, to improve the performance of the power
grid. We use our emergency control scheme to model the impact
of communication loss on the grid. We show that unlike previous
models used in the literature, the loss of communication does not
necessarily lead to the failure of the correspondent power nodes;
i.e. the “point-wise” failure model is not appropriate. In addition,
we show that the impact of communication loss is a function of
several parameters such as the size and structure of the power and
communication failure, as well as the operating mode of power
nodes disconnected from the communication network. Our model
can be used to design the dependency between the power grid and
the communication network used for its control, so as to maximize
the benefit in terms of intelligent control, while minimizing the
risks due to loss of communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2003, 50 million people lost power due to the
large blackout in North East America. According to the after-
math reports [1]–[3], initially, three power lines in Ohio were
disconnected due to inadequate tree trimming. These failures
caused tripping of overloaded lines and shedding of generators
experiencing under-frequency; however, these changes were not
monitored by grid operators. Consequently, the large imbalance
in the power grid led to a catastrophic cascade of failures
in other regions of United States and Canada. Similarly, in
September 2011, 2.7 million people lost power in Arizona,
Southern California, and Baja California, Mexico. This major
blackout started by tripping of a single power line; however,
since the grid was not operating in the secure N-1 state, it led
to a rapid cascade of failures in power lines and generators [4].
Studies [1], [4], [5] show that the main reasons behind both
blackouts were a lack of situational awareness and a lack of
coordination between grid operators in neighbor regions.
During normal operation, primary and secondary frequency
controls are responsible for stabilizing the grid. In particular,
primary frequency control is a local controller which reacts to
local changes in frequency and adjusts the generation to keep the
frequency within an acceptable range. The secondary controller
is responsible for setting the frequency back to its nominal value
(e.g. 60Hz in US) where it uses the generator’s reserves to
balance the power. However, during large failures the normal
operation controllers cannot stabilize the grid. Therefore, the
future smart grid should be equipped with a Communication
and Control Network (CCN) that allows rapid monitoring of the
power grid and provides intelligent centralized control actions
that can mitigate cascade of failures. The centralized control
This work was supported by DTRA grant HDTRA1-13-1-0021.
actions to stabilize the grid during catastrophic failures are
referred to as “Emergency Control”.
There are several studies proposing Emergency control
schemes for changing the power generation as well as load
shedding so that the grid can be stabilized before any cascading
failures occur [6]–[9]. Although, using this extra informa-
tion/control improves the performance of the grid, it creates
a dependency between the power grid and the communication
and control network.
During normal operations, loss of communication is unlikely
to lead to significant power failures as local controllers can
stabilize the grid. However, when the grid is under stress, lack
of situational awareness and control can lead to catastrophic
failures. Such events may result from a natural disaster that
affects both the communication network and the power grid or
the failure of communication components due to loss of power
coming from the grid. Therefore, it is very important to study
the impact of communication loss on the power grid’s stability
during a large disturbance.
The impact of communication on the power grid’s perfor-
mance and vice versa was recently studied using an abstract
form of interdependency. Buldyrev et al. in [10] showed that if
there exists a one-to-one interdependency between the nodes
of the grid and the communication network, interdependent
networks are more vulnerable to failures than isolated networks.
In their “point-wise” interdependency model, a power node
fails if it loses its connection to the communication network,
and a communication node fails if it loses its connection to
the power grid. Similar results were obtained in [11], [12].
Recently, [13] showed that it is critical to use the power flow
equations to model the power grid, and interdependency could
benefit the power grid if the communication network is used
for mitigating the cascade of failures (See Figure 1). As can
be seen, when the yield in interdependent power grid and
communication without control is lower than the isolated power
grid (Figure 1(a)). However, when intelligent control is applied
to the interdependent network, the yield is higher than the
isolated power grid (Figure 1(b)).
(a) No Control- Interdependent
networks are more vulnerable.
(b) Control - Interdependent
networks are more reliable.
Fig. 1. Comparing yield of interdependent and isolated power grids.
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In this paper, we carefully model the function of emergency
control of the grid using the communication and control net-
work. Using this model, we show that the loss of any commu-
nication network component may lead to the loss of situational
awareness and control, and impact the performance of the grid.
In particular, we show that the point-wise failure model is
not suitable for modeling interdependent power-communication
networks. Moreover, we show that the impact of communication
loss on the power grid is a function of several parameters such
as size and structure of the communication and power failures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we describe the power-communication dependency. In Section
III, we formulate the emergency control problem with full
and partial communication. Finally, in Section IV, we provide
simulation results and conclude in Section V.
II. MODEL
A. PowerGrid-Communication Dependency
Figure 2 shows an abstract model of the future control
and communication network for an interconnected grid. In this
model, each region is supported by a dedicated communication
network (intra-region communication network) that monitors all
parts of the grid, and sends the information to the control center.
The control decisions made by the control center are sent back
to the grid via the same communication network. Moreover, the
grid regions are connected to each other via several tie lines
that allows transmission of power from one region to the other.
Therefore, a failure in one region could cascade to the other
regions. In order to avoid such failures, the control centers are
connected to each other with an inter-region communication
network that allows them to share state information and regional
control decisions.
Fig. 2. Future Power Grid equipped with communication networks and control
centers for online monitoring and control; dotted lines indicate dependency
of power nodes on communication nodes. Power nodes that have lost their
connection to the communication network become “uncontrollable”.
It can be seen from Figure 2 that communication failures
could occur either between the regions or inside the regions.
Inter-region failures can degrade or disconnect the communica-
tion between the control centers in different regions. In contrast,
Intra-region failures can cause some of the power nodes to be
disconnected from the communication network and unable to
send information to or receive the control decisions from the
control center.
Fig. 3. Dotted lines indicate dependency of power nodes on communication
nodes. Power nodes that have lost their connection to the communication
network become “uncontrollable”.
In this paper, we study the case of intra-region failures. In
particular, we focus on the case where we are able to observe
the power failures; i.e. we have communication to the failed
power nodes (See Figure 3).
B. Power Grid
The power grid consists of nodes and power lines where
power nodes have three types: Generators (G) that generate
power; Loads (L) that consume power and Buses (B) that allow
the transmission of power through them, but neither generate
nor consume power. In our model, each generator or load is
connected to the rest of the grid via a single bus and each bus
can be connected to any number of buses. Figure 4 shows an
example of our system.
In this paper, we study the steady-state behavior of the
grid. We also assume that power lines are loss-less; i.e. can be
modeled only by their reactance X . Thus, the flow in a power
line is described by a DC model as follows: fijXij = ∆θij
where fij is the amount of power in line (i, j), Xij is the
reactance of line (i, j) and ∆θij represents the difference in
the voltage phase of nodes i and j.
The generators are modeled as synchronous generators with
the following swing equation:
Miω˙i = PGi −Di(ωi − ωs)− (
∑
j∈E fij −
∑
j∈E fji) (1)
where PGi denotes the mechanical power, and Di and
Mi are generator’s damping and inertia, respectively. More-
over, the difference in the flow passing through the generator
(
∑
j∈E fij −
∑
j∈E fji) denotes the amount of generated elec-
trical power. Finally, ωi is the frequency of node i and ωs is the
synchronous frequency [see [14] for more details]. Considering
the steady-state behavior (ω˙i = 0), the equation for synchronous
generators will reduce to:
PGi −Di(ωi − ωs) =
∑
j∈E
fij −
∑
j∈E
fji (2)
The damping coefficient Di is often 0.02 per unit or less
(See [15]-pp. 657-663 for more details). This model describes
the reaction of generator to the changes in power; if generation
is greater than the load, the frequency increases, and if the
generation is smaller than the load, the frequency decreases.
In order to avoid sharp changes in frequency, we also model
the local frequency-droop control (also called primary frequency
control) in the grid that is responsible for modifying the amount
of power generation based on the changes in frequency; i.e.
increases the power generation as frequency drops and decreases
the power generation as frequency rises. The droop-control can
be written as follows.
∆PGi = − 1
Ri
(ωi − ωs) (3)
where Ri is the regulation constant. In a per unit system,
the standard value of regulation constant is 0.05 per unit.
Thus, in our model of a 60Hz system, Ri = 60∗0.05PGinitiali
where
PGinitiali is the initial mechanical power of generator i before
any disturbance ( [15]-pp. 657-663). The combination of PGi
in equation 2 and ∆PGi in equation 3 models the response of
generator i to the changes in power using the local controller:
PGi − (Di + 1
Ri
)(ωi − ωs) =
∑
j∈E
fij −
∑
j∈E
fji (4)
For the rest of this paper, we define αi = Di + 1Ri .
Finally, we consider protection relays located at every power
node. The control role of these relays is explained in section
II-D.
C. Communication Network
We consider a zero-delay communication network that sup-
ports every power node; i.e. collects synchronous information
from every power node, sends it to the control center and sends
back the control decision from the control center to all power
nodes. The set of collected information by the communication
network includes: (i) Magnitude of voltage at node k (Vk(t));
(ii) Phase of voltage at node k (θk(t)); (iii) Frequency of node k
(ωk(t)); (iv) Flow in power line (k, j) (fkj(t)); (v) on/off State
of element j (Sj(t)).
Note that since we use the DC model in the paper, the
magnitude of voltage Vk(t) is constant and equal to 1 for all
nodes. Moreover, the “off” state of an element means that it has
failed.
D. Control Actions
Next, we describe both types of local and centralized control
actions needed for operation of the power grid.
Local Control Actions: All power nodes are equipped
with local controllers that do not require connection to the
communication network and their actions include: (i) droop
control at generators: Droop control can increase or decrease
the amount of generation based on the changes in the frequency
as described by equations 3 and 4; (ii) Over-frequency generator
tripping (protection): the protection relays will trip the generator
if the frequency exceeds the maximum threshold ωmax due
to excess generation in the system; (iii) Under-frequency load
shedding (protection): the protection relays will shed the load if
the frequency drops below the minimum threshold ωmin due
to excess load in the system; (iv) Overloaded line tripping
(protection): the protection relays will trip the line if the power
in that line exceeds the capacity.
Central Control Actions: All power nodes are equipped
with sensors/actuators connected to the control center via the
communication network. The central control actions include: (i)
Ramping down generators: if power generation is greater than
consumption, the controller decreases the generation to keep
the frequency within the acceptable range; (ii) Intelligent load
shedding: if the power generation is lower than consumption,
the controller sheds some load to keep the frequency within the
acceptable range; (iii) Intelligent line tripping: can be used for
changing the topology of the grid or islanding some areas of the
power grid. Since in our model every power node is equipped
with an actuator, a power line can be tripped by either of its
end-nodes.
III. EMERGENCY CONTROL
In this Section, we design the optimal emergency control
used for mitigation of failures in the power grid in the presence
of a fully or partially operational communication network.
We can then use these control policies for evaluating the
performance of the grid under different communication failure
scenarios.
A. Full Communication
In this case, the power grid is fully supported by a com-
munication network; thus, every generator, load and line can be
centrally controlled. The optimal emergency control is the set of
central and local control actions that maximizes the served load
while keeping the power balanced, maintaining the frequency
within an acceptable range and keeping the flows in the power
lines within their capacity. We use the control model with full
communication as a basis for modeling the control with partial
communication.
In eq. (5), we formulate the problem of optimal control
with the objective of maximizing served load while stabilizing
the grid. Let, VG, VL and VB denote the set of generators,
loads and bus nodes after the initial power failure, respectively.
Moreover, let ωmini and ω
max
i denoted the minimum and
maximum frequency thresholds. In addition, E denotes the set
of power lines after the initial failure, and Xij represents the
reactance of line (i, j). Finally, let M be a large constant.
The variables fij and ∆θij denote the amount of flow in line
(i, j) as well as the phase difference of voltages at nodes i and
j. In addition, variables PGi, PLi and ωi denote the amount
of generation, load and frequency at node i. Note that PGi and
PLi take positive and negative values, respectively. Finally, zij
is a binary variable associated to line (i, j) that takes value of 1
if line (i, j) is connected and 0 if that line is tripped (modeled
in constraint (5k)).
As mentioned previously, the objective is to serve the
maximum load while stabilizing the grid. Constraints (5b,5c,5d)
ensure that the flow conservation is satisfied in generators, loads
and buses where generation and load values PGi and PLi can
change by central controller and term αi(ωi − ωs) models the
local droop controller at the generators. Constraint (5e) models
the DC power flow in line (i, j) if it remain connected; i.e.
zi,j = 1; note that there is no relation between the phases at
nodes i and j if the line is tripped (zi,j = 0). Constraint (5f)
guarantees that the flow in line (i, j) is within the capacity if the
line is not tripped, and constraint (5g) ensures that all nodes in
a connected area have the same frequency. Finally, constraints
(5h, 5i, 5j) guarantee that the values of frequency, generation
and load are maintained within the acceptable range.
min
∑
i∈VL
PLi (5a)∑
j∈E
fij −
∑
j∈E
fji = PGi − αi(ωi − ωs) ∀i ∈ VG (5b)∑
j∈E
fij −
∑
j∈E
fji = PLi ∀i ∈ VL (5c)∑
j∈E
fij −
∑
j∈E
fji = 0 ∀i ∈ VB (5d)
−M(1− zij) ≤ Xijfij −∆θij ≤M(1− zij)∀(i, j) ∈ E (5e)
−zijfmaxij ≤ fij ≤ zijfmaxij ∀(i, j) ∈ E (5f)
−M(1− zij) ≤ ωi − ωj ≤M(1− zij) ∀(i, j) ∈ E (5g)
ωmini ≤ ωi ≤ ωmaxi ∀i ∈ VG (5h)
PGmini ≤ PGi − αi(ωi − ωs) ≤ PGmaxi ∀i ∈ VG (5i)
PLmaxi ≤ PLi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ VL (5j)
zij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ E (5k)
B. Partial Communication
Next, we consider the case that in addition to the power
failure, a part of the communication network fails as well. Thus,
parts of the grid lose their connection to the communication
network and control center. Our objective is to design an
emergency control policy that maximizes the served load and
stabilizes the grid using the controllable nodes.
Figure 4 shows an example of such power grid with power
failures and controllable/uncontrollable areas. In the following,
we define each area mathematically, and explain the set of
control actions available in each.
Fig. 4. Power Grid Model after Communication Loss and Power Failure
The components that have not initially failed in the power
grid can be divided into 3 areas described as follows:
Uncontrollable Area: Let G1 = {V1, E1} denote the un-
controllable subset of power grid, where V1 denotes the set
of power nodes that are disconnected from the communication
network, and E1 denotes the set of power lines that connect any
pair of nodes in V1. Without loss of generality, we can divide
subgraph G1 into k disjoint subgraphs Gk1 = {V k1 , Ek1 } such
that nodes inside V ki1 are connected and for any j 6= i nodes
in V ki1 and V
kj
1 are not connected. Note that depending on the
structure of the network, k could be any number equal or greater
than 1. The only possible centralized control in these areas is
islanding of the entire area by tripping border lines. All of the
local controllers described in Section II-D; i.e. droop control
and protection schemes, are available. In addition, we have a
local controller that switches the nodes in the uncontrollable
areas to a pre-defined mode of operation as soon as they are
disconnected from the communication network. In this paper,
we consider two possible modes: Pinit which corresponds to
keeping all nodes operating at their last state, and Pzero which
corresponds to tripping all nodes.
Controllable Area: Let G2 = {V2, E2} denote the con-
trollable subset of the power grid, where V2 is the set of
power nodes that are connected to the communication network
(V2 ∩ V1 = ∅ and V2 ∪ V1 = V where V is the set of all power
nodes), and E2 is the set of power lines connecting any pair
of nodes in V2. All central and local controllers described in
Section II-D are available in the controllable areas.
Border Lines: Let Ek12 denote the set of power lines that
connect the uncontrollable nodes in V k1 to the controllable nodes
in V2. Border lines can be tripped centrally using the relay in
its controllable node. All local controllers at its end-nodes are
available.
In eq. (6), we formulate the optimal emergency control
problem subject to loss of communication. Given the set of
control actions, the behavior of the controllable areas can be
modeled as described in previous section with Full Control; i.e.,
eq. (6b). However, the nodes in the uncontrollable areas cannot
employ centralized control and must rely on localized control
and/or islanding as described next. The following ILP shows
the general description of optimal emergency control.
min
∑
i∈VL
PLi (6a)
s.t. Constraints(5b− 5k) ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ V2, (i, j) ∈ E2 ∪ Ek12 (6b)
Constraints(7a− 7i) ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ V k1 , (i, j) ∈ Ek1 (6c)
In the following, we describe constraints (7a-7h) re-
lated to the control actions in the uncontrollable areas. Let∑
(i,j)∈Ek12 zij = 0 if the uncontrollable area G
k
1 is isolated
from the rest of grid; i.e. all the border lines are tripped,
and
∑
(i,j)∈Ek12 zij > 0 if it is connected. Moreover, let I
k
be a binary variable (modeled in constraint (7i)) associated
with the uncontrollable area Gk1 where I
k = 0 if the isolated
uncontrollable area cannot be stabilized just by the local droop
controller, and Ik = 1 if that area is stabilized (i.e. power is
balanced just by using droop control and frequency and power
flows are within the acceptable range).
Constraints (7a-7h) model the control decision in the uncon-
trollable areas. Note that PGiniti and PL
init
i denote the values
of generators and loads in uncontrollable area after going to
mode Pinit; i.e. the last values of generators and loads right
before disconnection from communication network. If the mode
is set to Pzero, PGiniti and PL
init
i in constraints (7b) and
(7c) will be set to zero. Constraint (7a) denotes that if the
uncontrollable area is unstable (Ik = 0), it has to be islanded
(
∑
(i,j)∈Ek12 zij).
When an uncontrollable area can be stabilized just by local
controllers; i.e. Ik = 1, constraints (7a-7h) will be active. In par-
ticular, constraints (7b-7d) model the power balance in the area
using only the droop control at generators, and constraint (7e)
models the DC power flow in line (i, j). Moreover, constraint
(7f) guarantees that flow is within the line capacities, constraint
(7g) forces all the connected nodes to have the same frequency
and constraint (7h) guarantees that the frequency remains within
the acceptable range.∑
(i,j)∈Ek12
zij ≤MIk ∀k ∈ K (7a)
−M(1− Ik) ≤
∑
j
fij −
∑
j
fji − PGiniti + αi(ωi − ωs)
≤M(1− Ik) ∀i ∈ V kG1, ∀k ∈ K (7b)
−M(1− Ik) ≤
∑
j
fij −
∑
j
fji − PL initi ≤M(1− Ik)
∀i ∈ V kL1,∀k ∈ K (7c)
−M(1− Ik) ≤
∑
j
fij −
∑
j
fji ≤M(1− Ik)
∀i ∈ V kB1, ∀k ∈ K (7d)
−M(1− Ik) ≤ Xijfij −∆θij ≤M(1 − Ik)
∀(i, j) ∈ Ek1 , ∀k ∈ K (7e)
−fmaxij Ik ≤ fij ≤ fmaxij Ik ∀(i, j) ∈ Ek1 , ∀k ∈ K (7f)
−M(1− Ik) ≤ ωi − ωj ≤M(1− Ik) ∀(i, j) ∈ Ek1 , ∀k ∈ K (7g)
ωmini I
k ≤ ωi ≤ ωmaxi Ik ∀i ∈ V kG1, ∀k ∈ K (7h)
Ik ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ K (7i)
Note that when Ik = 0, the uncontrollable area is unstable;
i.e. either power cannot be balanced just by droop controller or
some lines are overloaded. Thus, the frequency and line protec-
tion relays will be activated to trip the generators, shed the load
and trip the lines. This causes extra failures which activates more
protection relays. The cascade of failures continue until power
is balanced, and frequency and power flows are within their
acceptable ranges. We model the cascading failures separately
for each uncontrollable area k after observing its correspondent
Ik value.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We analyze the data from the Italian power grid which
consists of 310 buses, 113 generator units and 97 loads. The
power failures are considered to be generators. We assume that
any arbitrary area in the power grid can lose its connection to
the communication network, and investigate the impact of these
uncontrollable areas on the performance of the grid. The metric
that we use for our analysis is “yield” defined as the ratio of
served load 1 to the initial load.
Simulation results show that loss of communication can
indeed impact the performance of the power grid and lead to a
lower yield. For example, we observed a scenario where loss of
10 power nodes led to 6% load shedding under full communi-
cation and 23% load shedding under parial communication (See
[16]). In this section, we would like to find the parameters that
have the greatest impact on performance.
A. Effect of size and structure of uncontrollable areas
We consider different number of uncontrollable nodes with
different clusterings. In particular, we define a cluster as a set
1Served Load is considered to be the sum of power from controllable
areas, stable uncontrollable areas and unstable uncontrollable areas that have
experienced cascading failures.
of connected nodes where a cluster of size 1 means that no
two uncontrollable nodes are connected and a cluster of size 10
means that the uncontrollable area can be divided into disjoint
subareas, each with 10 connected nodes.
Fig. 5. Average yield vs. Number of uncontrollable power nodes; Pinit mode.
Figure 5 shows that for a given size of power disturbance,
the average yield (over 100 scenarios) decreases as the number
of uncontrollable nodes increases. In addition, it shows that for
the same number of uncontrollable nodes, the average yield
decreases as the size of cluster increases. We observed that for
the cases that all the uncontrollable areas can be stabilized using
droop control; i.e. Ik = 1, the yield of partial communication
is very close to the yield of full communication. However, for
the cases that at least one uncontrollable area is unstable, the
yield decreases significantly. Since large clusters could contain
more generators and loads, the effect of loss of such clusters
is more severe. Moreover, Figure 6 shows the impact of size
and structure of uncontrollable areas on their stability. It can
be seen that as the size of uncontrollable area increases the
fraction of unstable cases increases. In addition, it can be seen
that as the size of clusters increases, it is less probable to lose
a cluster. This is due to the fact that a large cluster could
contain more power, and losing it could cause a significant
loss of power. Finally, observations from Figures 5 and 6 show
that every uncontrollable power node does not fail; i.e. “point-
wise” failure model is not appropriate for power-communication
interdependency.
Fig. 6. Fraction of cases with unstable islands vs. Number of uncontrollable
power nodes; Pinit mode.
B. Effect of Size of Power Loss
Next, we consider the effect of size of power failure on
performance. Figure 7 shows that as the size of power failure
increases, the average yield decreases. Moreover, it shows that
the impact of communication loss increases as the number of
power failures increases. This is due to the fact that for larger
sizes of uncontrollable areas, it is harder to control a power
disturbance and the impact on the yield is more severe.
Fig. 7. Average yield vs. Number of initially failed power nodes; Pinit mode.
C. Effect of Different Modes
Finally, we compare the impact of different predefined
modes Pinit and Pzero described in Section III-B. By simulating
different failure scenarios under both modes, we observed that
there exist scenarios where controlling the grid under Pzero
mode leads to higher yield than Pinit mode. In fact, in such
scenarios, keeping the uncontrollable area operating at the Pinit
mode was infeasible; thus, they were islanded due to instability.
But, under Pzero mode, it is possible to keep an uncontrollable
area and use the buses in that area for transmitting power. Figure
8 shows that although in most cases the Pinit mode results
in a higher yield, the fraction of scenarios with Y (Pzero) >
Y (Pinit) increases as the number of uncontrollable nodes or
failed power nodes increases. In particular, we observed that for
the cases where Pinit has the higher yield, the average difference
in yieldis 7% and for the cases where Pzero has the higher yield,
the average difference is 8%.
Fig. 8. Fraction of cases with (Y (Pzero) > Y (Pinit)) vs. Number of initially
failed power nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that although controlling the
power grid using the communication network could be very
beneficial, it could be harmful if we lose part of the control
and communication network. Therefore, it is essential to have
a thorough analysis on the impact of communication network
on power grid to identify the vulnerabilities of the system.
In particular, we showed that this impact is a function of
several parameters including the size and structure of the
communication loss. Therefore, it is very important to not only
design a robust communication network, but also allocate the
communication nodes to the power grid so that the negative
impact of communication loss is minimized. Another direction
of research is to design more intelligent local controllers so that
in the lack of communication, the nodes can stabilize the grid
even during large disturbances.
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